By Alaa Alkhatib

February 18, 2026

 

This article is the first in a series accompanying a video series that examines Islamic history from an analytical, critical perspective, neither hagiographic nor hostile. The aim is not to discuss faith or religious values, but to read historical facts as human events that occurred within a specific social and political context, using tools familiar to the science of state formation.

The series proceeds from a simple methodological premise: The historical Islamic experience was an experience of founding a society, authority, and system of governance within the conditions of its time and place. It was subject, like other historical experiences, to balances of power, alliances, economics, and the struggle for legitimacy.

In this foundational article, we focus on the transition from the call in Mecca to the formation of Medinan society, what can be described as the nucleus of an emerging political entity, the “Medinan polity”, as a historical human case study, not as a complete constitutional model in the modern sense.

 

Introduction: Rereading the Beginnings

Between the traditional discourse that sanctifies Medina as a utopian model descended from heaven, and the hostile discourse that reduces the experience to its historical context alone, the historical facts cry out for a methodological rereading—one that strips analysis of sanctification without denying it to the sacred text itself.

Medina after the Hijrah (migration) was not merely a “mosque and graves,” but a political “start- up” par excellence, facing the challenges of existence amidst a jungle of tribal loyalties and ethnic solidarities. Here, religion was not merely a ritual but transformed into a “technology of sovereignty” for managing conflict and navigating diversity.

The central question this episode poses:
Did Islam begin as a theory of the state? Or as a religious- social call that later transformed its community into a political entity?

Mecca: A Doctrinal Call Without a Governing Apparatus

The call in Mecca continued for more than a decade without producing a state, an administrative apparatus, or governing institutions. No system of authority emerged, no enforcement mechanism, no management of public affairs in the name of the believing community. The community was small, persecuted, possessing no land, no army, and no enforceable law.

This distinction is methodologically crucial: The emergence of a creed does not mean the emergence of a state. The state, in historical definition, begins when public affairs are managed on a specific territory through organized authority.

Sources mention that Quraysh (the dominant tribe in Mecca) offered various forms of social and political co- optation- status, alliance, leadership – and these were rejected. In the faithful reading, this is principled steadfastness. In a political reading, it can be understood as a refusal to integrate into an existing system in favor of building an independent community that would later produce its own system.

 

The Hijrah: From Persecuted Community to Nucleus of Authority

The Hijrah (migration) to Yathrib (which would become Medina) was the major turning point. It was not merely a geographical relocation, but a functional transformation: from a community with no space of its own to a community possessing: land, local allies, a network of relationships, and the capacity for self- organization.

Yathrib suffered from prolonged conflicts between the Aws and Khazraj tribes (the dominant Arab tribes in the city), alongside the presence of economically powerful Jewish tribes, and a clear arbitral vacuum. The environment was ripe for accepting a unifying mediator. Here, the call enters the political- social sphere, and the process of building a decision- making center begins.

In political sociology, this moment marks the beginning of the “politicization of the community.”

 

Al- Mu’akhat (Brotherhood): An Economic and Social Safety Net

The “brotherhood” (al- mu’akhat) established between the Emigrants (Muhajirun, those who left Mecca) and the Helpers (Ansar, the native inhabitants of Medina) is usually presented as a spiritual- ethical bond. However, it also served a crucial economic function. The Emigrants had left their wealth and trade in Mecca, and the risk of social collapse for the new community was real.

The brotherhood system created a mechanism for resource redistribution, employment opportunities, and social integration. The famous example of Abd al- Rahman ibn Awf (a prominent companion of the Prophet), when offered half a Helper’s wealth, he asked for the marketplace instead of charity, reveals a swift transition to productive integration.

Medina was not a welfare society, but an open market. This is important for understanding that the nascent community sought early economic independence—a classic condition in the emergence of political entities.

 

The Constitution of Medina: A Multi- Party Political Contract

The “Constitution of Medina” (Sahifat al- Madinah) is often read as a religious document, but from an analytical perspective, it appears closer to a political- security contract between different groups. Its texts regulate: collective defense, legal responsibility, dispute resolution, mutual obligations, and recognition of independent tribal units.

The document was not a theocratic constitution, but rather a “security pact.” When the Prophet recognizes the Jews as “one community (ummah) with the believers” (not of the believers), he is not merely practicing “religious tolerance” in the modern sense, but exercising “political realism” (Realpolitik). He establishes a legitimacy based on “fact on the ground” and shared geography, not solely on unity of creed.

This was not “religious tolerance” in the modern sense, but “political realism.” The Prophet realized that building a “state” required securing the internal front through military alliances with forces possessing wealth and weapons (the Jewish tribes). Here, political identity (the “ummah of Medina”) preceded and encompassed religious identity. Sovereignty here is built through “covenant” not “exclusion.” This is closer to a confederal social contract than to a religious- doctrinal constitution. Here we see the first framework of governance: contractual, security- based, political. This pattern is historically known in alliances between cities and tribes during the foundational stages of states.

 

The Early Battles: Struggle for Entity Consolidation

The early battles – Badr, Uhud, and al- Khandaq (the Trench) – can be read religiously in terms of mobilization, but they can also be read as survival struggles for a nascent entity. Every state in its formative stage undergoes a phase of consolidation by force.

The Battle of Badr, for example, is not understood only as a doctrinal clash, but also within the context of the struggle over trade routes and resources. Quraysh’s caravans were an economic lifeline. Striking them meant economic and political pressure.

The outcomes of Badr, in terms of spoils and symbolism, contributed to consolidating the legitimacy of the new center in Medina and enhancing its deterrent power.

 

The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah: Strategic Realism

The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah is the moment when the “state leader” clearly appeared behind the cloak of the “Prophet.” Accepting Quraysh’s seemingly unfair terms was not weakness, but a “pause before the strategic explosion.” The leader sacrificed slogans (such as omitting “Basmallah” [the phrase “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful”] and accepting the removal of the title “Messenger of God”) for geopolitical gains. Here we see true deconstruction: politics is the art of the possible, even in moments of revelation.

The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah represents a highly significant moment of strategic negotiation. Accepting terms whose surface was unbalanced, such as the wording of the agreement text, in exchange for a truce and practical recognition, reflects calculations of power, not emotional impulse.

In political negotiation theory, this is considered a model of “tactical concession for strategic gain.” The truce allowed for internal reorganization and expansion of alliances, which later manifested in the widening of influence.

 

Hunayn and “Those Whose Hearts are to be Reconciled” (Al- Mu’allafatu Qulubuhum): Engineering Loyalties

In the Battle of Hunayn (a battle fought after the conquest of Mecca against the Hawazin tribe), the distribution of spoils to the leaders of Quraysh (“those whose hearts are to be reconciled”, a category mentioned in the Quran for distributing charity/zakat) was not merely a da’wah (proselytizing) act, but “social engineering” to purchase solid tribal loyalties. Here, the state builds its own “elite” and uses financial surplus to ensure the survival of the nascent system amidst a sea of potential opponents.

He granted Abu Sufyan ibn Harb (a leading figure of Quraysh who had recently embraced Islam) 100 camels and 40 uqiyas (ounces) of silver, 100 camels to Hakim ibn Hizam, the same to Safwan ibn Umayyah, and others among the leaders of Quraysh.

This measure can be read ethically in several ways… but politically it is clear:
Managing loyalties. Containing elites. Reducing the likelihood of rebellion. Building stability. All nascent states do this in different forms.

The Entry of Tribes: Collective Calculations

In the later stages, entire tribes entered Islam. Many tribes were waiting to see the outcome of the conflict between the Muslims led by the Prophet and Quraysh, their unspoken sentiment being: “Watch them; if he prevails over them, he is a true prophet.” Hence, the ninth year after the Hijrah, the year following the conquest of Mecca, was named the “Year of Delegations” (‘Am al- Wufud). It is narrated that the Prophet received about 70 delegations from Arab tribes across the length and breadth of the Arabian Peninsula, such as the delegations of Thaqif, Tamim, Abd al- Qays, Hanifah, and others.

Here, an important transformation occurs: Islam was no longer just the belief of individuals, but a framework for collective identity. When a tribe entered, it brought its entire network, loyalties, and internal balances. And here, the political community expands rapidly.

 

Conclusion: A State of Necessity, Not a State of Religion

Imagine the Prophet in Medina, he did not only speak about prayer, but spent his days concluding “military alliances” and managing “economic caravans.” When he wrote the “Constitution of Medina,” he did not use the language of preaching, but the language of the “social contract.” He made the Jews and polytheists part of the “political community” in exchange for collective defense. Why? Because a nascent state does not live on slogans, but on shared security and mutual interests.

Islam in Medina donned the cloak of the “state” in its raw concept: land, people, and absolute sovereignty. The entry of the Arabs into Islam as tribes was not a sudden collective spiritual transformation, but a submission to a new political centrality that had proven its effectiveness in the field.

The Medinan polity was not a “religious state,” but a “state of necessity” formed within an eminently human historical context. In the next episode, we will see how this structure exploded upon the departure of the founder at the “Saqifah of Bani Sa’idah” (the meeting place where the succession of Abu Bakr was decided), where the real struggle began over who holds the right to decide.

 

The Faith- Based Reading and the Historical Reading

One might say: All these facts – the treaties, alliances, negotiations, management of power- are, in the believer’s view, part of revelation itself, intended to teach the model of the state. This is a legitimate faith- based interpretation within its doctrinal framework.

But historical reading operates differently: It does not ask: Was the decision revelation or not? Rather, it asks: How did the leader act? What tools did he use? Were they supra- historical tools… or human tools known in the building of political entities?

When we look at the facts, we find that: taking the balance of power into account, building alliances, concluding covenants, delaying confrontation, absorbing opponents, managing loyalties, redistributing resources—all these are tools known in the formation of ancient states, in the Arabian Peninsula, and in neighboring empires.

The reading here does not negate faith, but it refuses to transform the historical experience into a ready- made constitutional model for all time.
It simply says: The experience was great, but it was also historically human. Even if the believer considers the decision to be revelation, that revelation descended within a specific social and political context, interacted with the tools of reality, and did not build a state through supernatural mechanisms, but through understandable human mechanisms.

 

Summary:

The Medina experience was a foundational experience of immense impact, but it was also a historical human experience, shaped within the conditions of reality, and with tools understandable within the science of the state.

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You might want to read the full paper at this link:History of Islam (full article): Islam Between the Sacred and the Human

Or you might be interested in reading the rest of the series:

1. Sovereignty and Negotiation: An Analytical Reading of the Formation of the “Medinan Polity”
2. Post-Founder Era: The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Test of Survival. The Saqifa, the Ridda, and the Conquest
3. From Omar’s Assassination to the Great Fitna: The Cracking of the Center. When the State Devours its Children
4. From Caliphate to Kingdom: The Birth of the Empire, The Umayyad Dynasty
5. The Global Empire: The Labor of Nationalities and the Making of the Muslim Mind. The Power vs. The Jurist
6. The Breaking of the Center: The Era of Sultans and the Making of Orthodoxy
7. The Era of Fracture: Crusaders, Mongols, and the Fiqh of Siege
8. The Tunnel of Stagnation and the Shock of Awakening
9. The Crossroads: Aborted Enlightenment and the Rise of Ideology
10. The Historical Trial: Toward an Islam Without Idols